“The Americans don’t like the euro. What would they have preferred? Nothing at all. No euro. No European currency.”
Bernard Lietaer
„America is experiencing the dying years of being an empire and acting as the world’s sole super power. Much of the world’s countries accounting for one-quarter of global GDP no longer respect it nor wish to mimic its political structure. The group of countries centred on the BRICS/SCO and others desire a multilateral order.“
Simon Hunt
In our In Gold we Trust report 2017, we devoted an entire section to the subject of “de-dollarization” for the first time. Since then, there has been more rapid progress on the issue than could have been expected at this time last year. The establishment of a crude oil fixing denominated in renminbi can probably be seen as another milestone on the road to the internationalization of China’s “people’s currency”. A gold fixing denominated in renminbi had already been introduced at an earlier juncture.
At the same time, Beijing has once again signaled that it is no longer interested in continuing to amass US Treasuries. It’s a simple calculation: The better established and more widely accepted the renminbi (yuan) becomes globally, the fewer US dollar reserves the People’s Republic needs. China’s plan seems obvious: One day the yuan is supposed to replace the US dollar as the senior global reserve currency.
Or is it? Many observers are expressing doubts about this plan, not least due to the fact that no structural shift in current account balances seems to be in sight. The problem? Government-controlled media in Asia and Russia are celebrating every new agreement and every small step as though it were the final nail in the dollar’s coffin. Thus it is easy for Americans to say: “This is simply not true. The yuan’s importance may be growing, but overall it remains negligible.”
Both perspectives lack a third, rather more neutral evaluation of the situation. The Europeans, of all people, who introduced the only serious competitor to the US dollar in form of the euro, are especially cautious on the subject. Probably this is because they are aware that the process of “de-dollarization” is likely to take decades to play out. It took Europe itself more than 40 years to introduce the euro.
We will begin this section with a discussion of recent developments in China and document the bilateral agreements aimed at avoiding the US dollar. Thereafter we will examine their significance against the background of the euro project. Our interview on the topic with Luke Gromen, an analyst we highly respect, concludes this section.
Considering the euro is important, inter alia, in order to gauge the part gold may be playing. In our opinion it is not a “battle of the US dollar against the yuan” that is at issue. Rather than a battle, a cautious and gradual reconstruction of an outdated monetary order is underway. It may well be the most important story no one is reporting.
„Let China sleep, for when she awakes, she will shake the world.“
Napoleon Bonaparte
China’s rapid rise to the status of an important global economic power has been quite impressive. China imports more oil and gold than any other country does.
Sources: CEIC, Incrementum AG
China’s launch on Monday of its crude futures exchange will improve the clout of the yuan in financial markets and could threaten the international primacy of the dollar, argues a new report by Hayden Briscoe, APAC head of fixed income at UBS Asset Management.
Already on Monday, Unipec, the trading arm of Asia’s largest refiner Sinopec, has inked a deal with a Western oil major to buy Middle East crude priced against the newly launched Shanghai crude futures contract.
This helps cement the exchange’s viability and challenges the petro-dollar system, in which oil deals are executed in dollars. This would decrease demand for the greenback and boost US Inflation.[1]
China has waited for this moment for more than 20 years. A similar plan failed in 1993. Obviously, quite a bit has changed since then. China has not only ascended to the rank of the second-largest economic power, it also holds a veritable mountain of Treasury bonds and has become the largest creditor of the United States.
Sources: Bloomberg, Incrementum AG
A few weeks before the launch of the oil futures contract in Shanghai, Beijing once again dropped hints that it is increasingly uncomfortable with this creditor role. We couldn’t fail to notice that China has begun to leak such reports to Western news agencies in a deliberate manner – probably in order to achieve the greatest possible impact:
Officials reviewing China’s foreign-exchange holdings have recommended slowing or halting purchases of U.S. Treasuries, according to people familiar with the matter. China holds the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves, at $3.1 trillion, and regularly assesses its strategy for investing them. It isn’t clear whether the recommendations of the officials have been adopted.[2]
It is also noteworthy that Western media have begun to highlight the importance of such announcements. At the same time, we have to wonder why currencies and government debt continue to be considered separately. Not even when President Trump imposed new punitive tariffs against China was anyone linking the event to the global competition between the US dollar and the renminbi. The question is, why not?
We will summarize the silence in one sentence: China doesn’t want to amass even more US dollars, because Beijing will need ever fewer dollars to pay for its imports of oil and other commodities in the future. How so? The reason is that it is creating its own markets around the yuan. China intends to become the second player on the world stage that is able to pay in its own currency for imports of oil (and other commodities). It is definitely no coincidence that a few days after the launch of the Shanghai oil futures contract, Reuters published an “exclusive” story on China’s plans to intensify negotiations on bilateral oil trading agreements settled in yuan:
“Being the biggest buyer of oil, it’s only natural for China to push for the usage of yuan for payment settlement. This will also improve the yuan liquidity in the global market,” said one of the people briefed on the matter by Chinese authorities.
China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer and in 2017 overtook the United States as the biggest importer of crude oil. Its demand is a key determinant of global oil prices.
The plans coincide with this week’s launch of the first Chinese crude oil futures in Shanghai, which many expect to become a third global price benchmark alongside Brent and West Texas Intermediate crude.
Russia and Angola are two of the top suppliers of crude oil to China, along with Saudi Arabia.[3]
This Reuters report is remarkable not only because the dominant role of the US dollar is openly discussed but also because it is at least implied that longtime US ally Saudi Arabia is likely to tip the oil market scales. So far Riyadh has not sold any oil in exchange for yuan. The pressure to do so is rising, though, because Russia and other large exporters will be happy to take market share from the Saudis in the Chinese market. It even seems possible that China will ultimately force Saudi Arabia to accept settlement in yuan.[4]
The article is also noteworthy because oil trading denominated in yuan is not an entirely new thing. These are by no means China’s “first steps” with respect to using the yuan as an oil-trading currency, as Reuters indicates in the headline. The role played by Iran is left out completely. Tehran had officially confirmed in 2016 already that it was selling oil to China for yuan and to other countries for euros.[5] Iran is one of the most important driving forces in the de-dollarization movement, after China and Russia. Tehran is trading, with Turkey and important US ally South Korea, among others, in euros and/or their own currencies.
Sources: WTEx, Incrementum AG
In any case, 2018 will enter the history books as the year in which the “petro-yuan” was officially born. The process of establishing the Chinese currency as a petro-currency (and subsequently as a reserve currency) is not an overnight affair; rather, it is likely to take decades. To simply call it an “attack on the US dollar” actually falls short. In our opinion it is by no means certain that China wishes to stand the global monetary order on its head by taking these steps. It rather looks as though it is securing the advantages associated with boosting use of the yuan and broadening its distribution in a gradual manner.
„OPEC was made redundant once oil began being priced in both CNY & USD, because the position of the lowest cost producer shifts from the nation with the lowest USD production costs to the nation with the cheapest currency vs. gold.“
Luke Gromen
The internationalization of the yuan can be viewed as a mirror image of the de-dollarization of the world. But even if it appears at first glance as though China is destined to win and America is destined to lose, the situation is not that simple. China has maneuvered itself into a difficult starting position, beginning with the graphical design of the renminbi banknote. Every single note is graced with the portrait of the “Great Chairman” Mao, who was not exactly renowned for his economic literacy. Many foreigners, with the possible exception of Europeans, would probably refuse to accept a banknote adorned with the likeness of Mao.
Naturally, much has been learned in Beijing since Mao’s day. Wikipedia has long devoted a separate page to the “Internationalization of the renminbi”.[6] The German news magazine Der Spiegel had already reported in 2011 on the timetable that is now being implemented:
China’s long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency. If that happens, other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies, the dollar and the euro. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions, gaining more favorable terms as a result, in its global shopping spree, such as in the commodities markets. Years ago, Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. During these sessions, the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency.[7]
The challenges remain the same to this day, and China’s leadership has grown quite familiar with them. How much freedom in the market are they willing to permit their currency in order to promote its international acceptance? Control over the exchange rate is not the only concern, though it is of course an important one. If the international role of the yuan continues to grow, China has to expect that the currency will appreciate in the long term. Beijing’s control over the currency’s exchange rate has long been criticized in the West, particularly by Washington.
It is well-known that the Chinese government exerts a great degree of influence over its economy. Beijing steers the Chinese economy not only by setting official growth targets but also by maintaining direct government control over the country’s largest banks. This control allows the politburo to direct the allocation of investment into areas it prefers. The Brookings Institution, a think tank that, incidentally, has hired the last two Fed chairpersons, analyzed the situation extensively in 2013 and concluded that China’s task is far more complex than we might expect at first glance:
Ultimately, the degree and depth of a currency’s internationalization depends on the openness, sophistication and depth of the host country’s financial markets. If these markets are very deep, very open and very flexible, international investors will willingly participate in them on a large scale, and hold the necessary currency balances to do so.
Yet the creation of such financial markets is extraordinarily difficult, and carries with it many risks. At the simplest level, banks could be disintermediated and lose their predominant position in funding investment. This would mean the erosion of the government’s ability to influence the allocation of capital to projects it deems developmentally important.[8]
This explanation makes clear why the process is a “marathon”. After many years of efforts, the yuan is still far from fulfilling the conditions required of a global reserve currency, not to mention the leading one. Even if the importance of the US dollar rests to a considerable extent on its role as a petro-currency, that is far from the only reason for its dominance. In other words, just because a “petro-yuan” is coming into view, it is still a long way from being number one in the world.
Sources: Luke Gromen, FFTT, EIA, Incrementum AG
The yuan is still far from being the “new global reserve currency”, as some people assert. As a medium for international payment transactions, the renminbi ranks in sixth place, according to SWIFT data. With a share of just 1.7%, it not only ranks well behind the US dollar (42%) and the euro (31% ) but also behind the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the Canadian dollar.[9]
In reality it would currently not be possible for China to settle all its oil purchases in yuan. Trading in the yuan simply lacks the necessary liquidity. Global foreign exchange markets, which are home to daily trading volumes of up to USD 5tn, paint an even more drastic picture: 90% of all currency pairs traded include the US dollar. The yuan takes part in just 4% of all transactions, according to the latest figures released by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).[10]
With respect to foreign exchange reserves China’s situation doesn’t look any better. Almost 63% of all currency reserves are held in US dollars, 20% in euros, nearly 5% in yen, 4.5% in British pounds, and 2% in Canadian dollars. Even Australian dollar reserves, with a share of 1.7%, rank ahead of the renminbi, which represents just 1.2%. Of course, this share seems likely to increase due to the growing importance of the renminbi as a petro-currency. Nevertheless, other countries are likely to hesitate before committing to holding an overly large proportion of their reserves in a currency that is not freely convertible.
„In our experience, no opinion clears out a room quicker than questioning the pedigree of the U.S. dollar. We find Western investors remarkably closed-minded about the dollar’s reservecurrency status.“
Trey Reik,
Sprott Asset Management
Approaching the baggage claim area in a number of smaller European airports, we are often greeted by large billboard ads that announce “The World Currency”. The ads are from a Chinese bank, and the currency they refer to is of, course, the renminbi. The statement made in this ad is so far little more than an unproved assertion. Chinese diplomats in the know may smile when they see such ads in Europe: China still has a lot to learn from Europe with respect to currency policy. After all, the Europeans had already tangled with the Americans long before the first skyscraper was built in Shanghai. Belgian economist Bernard Lietaer, who developed the European currency unit ECU while he was in the employ of Belgium’s central bank, gave an interview in which he described this episode in currency history as follows:
“It all started in 1978, with a meeting between French president Valerie Giscard d’Estaing and German chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bremen. France and Germany went through a phase of great love for each other at the time. And I had just begun to work for the Belgian central bank.
D’Estaing then went to the Banque de France and said: “We have to create something specifically European.” Meanwhile, Schmidt said to the Bundesbank: “Make something that doesn’t displease the Americans.” Of course these two approaches were incompatible.
The euro put an end to the dollar’s monopoly position, as it is no longer the world’s sole reserve currency. When I met then Fed chairman Paul Volcker, he didn’t even introduce himself; instead he just asked: “What the hell are you doing with this ECU thing? Is the dollar no longer good enough?” [11]
A comprehensive discussion of the history of the euro is beyond the scope of this report. As the above-cited figures illustrate, though, the euro has established itself as the second-most important global reserve currency within less than two decades. And it has done so without introducing a euro-denominated gold or oil fixing. Of course, Europe is struggling with problems of its own.
Capital markets in the eurozone are significantly better developed than those in China, and Europe’s political and legal stability is of a different quality as well. Nevertheless, the unique construction of the euro as a common currency of 19 sovereign nations creates different challenges, as the Greek crisis has demonstrated. However, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors of the euro’s demise have been greatly exaggerated.
Fears over a potential breakup of the eurozone have declined substantially. As is the case with many other things, there is actually an index that measures the fear level of market participants with respect to the potential demise of the euro. At the end of January 2018 it declined to a new low. Only 6.9% of respondents still expected the eurozone to break up over the coming 12 months. The index has existed since 2012 and is based on a survey by German research house Sentix; around 1,000 investors take part in the survey. In July 2012 the index reached a high of 73%. That was the same month in which ECB chief Mario Draghi issued his famous pronouncement that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to rescue the euro.[12]
Much has been done to strengthen the eurozone in the wake of the crisis. The creation of a banking union under the central supervision of the ECB was a decisive step. The next step may be even more significant for the global heft of the euro: A capital market union is to be put into place in the EU. According to a study by Austrian economic research institute IHS, a strong “home bias” still prevails in EU capital markets.[13]
This bias is supposed to change gradually as the capital market union is implemented, a process that mainly involves harmonizing rules and regulations. Because Europe is organized in a more decentralized manner than China is, using capital markets for corporate financing, as is customary in the US, does not represent a political stumbling block but an explicit goal. In other words, Europe would like to reduce the economy’s dependence on the banking sector. These measures could create deeper and more flexible financial markets, which in turn would likely strengthen the euro’s attraction as a reserve currency.
Notably, it was the euro rather than the renminbi that benefited in terms of increased internationalization of the currency in the wake of China’s recent attacks on the dollar. US news agencies published exclusive reports on the euro’s growing advantage. Bloomberg reported that the euro’s share of global foreign exchange reserves is expected to increase from 20%to 25%in coming years:
With U.S. protectionism on the rise, a number of Wall Street strategists say the case for the euro has rarely been better. Existential crises that hobbled the European experiment have receded. A resurgent economy has spurred talk the region’s central bank will curb policies that drove euro yields below zero. And as President Donald Trump threatens a trade war with China, the European Union is pursuing free-trade deals all across Asia and Latin America.
After shunning the common currency for years because of negative interest rates and the region’s persistent turmoil, reserve managers at some of the biggest central banks are now looking to add more euros, according to two heads of foreign-exchange strategy who’ve held regular discussions with them. Developing countries and oil-exporting nations in the Middle East, which rely heavily on international trade, are the most likely to lift their euro allocations.
The ramifications of such a shift are significant. For over a half century, the dollar has been the reserve currency of choice for most of the world’s central banks because of its depth and stability in global markets. That status has given the U.S. some notable advantages. It has helped America keep a lid on funding costs, allowing it to run budget deficits, as trading partners park their dollars in U.S. government bonds.[14]
Like Reuters in its report on China, Bloomberg discussed quite openly the mechanics of the petro-dollar system and its importance for the US economy. As the article stresses, not only the government but also corporations have been able to take advantage of favorable funding conditions under the reign of “King Dollar” – and the policies of the Trump administration may be harming the dollar:
Contrast Trump’s rhetoric with Europe’s recent moves to forge closer trade ties with Japan, China and much of Latin America, including Mexico and Brazil. The EU’s total trade with China has jumped almost 75 percent in the past decade to $590 billion in 2016, IMF figures compiled by Bloomberg show. On that basis, the EU is on the cusp of eclipsing the U.S. as China’s biggest trade partner.[15]
There is a reason why so many people from China arrive at European airports.
“The fate of reserve currencies is to decline over time.”
Dr. Martin Murenbeeld
In Europe we sometimes get the impression that the German (or French) secret service has managed to pull off the coup of the century: infiltrating the Oval Office with one of its own agents. While the US public is worrying about Russia and Putin, Europeans are benefiting – particularly with respect to their relationship with China. As Der Spiegel reports:
Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping before she made her first visit to the Trump White House. Economy Minister Zypries likewise travelled to China before heading to the U.S. And Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, who is also Germany’s foreign minister, said in reference to Trump’s protectionist tendencies: “When one window closes, another opens.”
China, too, has been conspicuously seeking to improve relations with Germany. For weeks, Germans in Beijing have been noting a Chinese charm offensive, with diplomats and business leaders alike being asked by high-ranking Chinese functionaries what they can do to help.
“The election of Donald Trump has improved the dynamics in Chinese-European relations,” says Cui Hongjian, director of the European department of the China Institute of International Studies. “Europe and China share a confident view of globalization and international cooperation.” [16]
China’s giant “One Belt, One Road” project, also known as the “New Silk Road”, has by now made even the local papers in Europe. Municipal authorities are debating how they might maximize the benefits from the project. In short, China and Europe are drawing closer together – in trade, diplomacy, and the minds of their populations.
Naturally, a great many stumbling blocks remain. Germany is not particularly interested in seeing “Made in China” actually become serious competition in global markets. The propensity of the Chinese to copy Western technology while buying up European companies on a grand scale is causing alarm in Europe. In connection with the “New Silk Road”, local newspapers write about “oppressive contracts” allegedly proposed by Chinese negotiators in order to ensure that everything is done in accordance with China’s wishes.
The EU has already proved that China’s monumental economic project can work only if China accepts Europe as an equal partner and both sides have ownership in the “Silk Road”. From the European perspective this means that social and environmental factors have to be considered, as well as transparency. Chinese negotiators were reportedly “surprised” that the EU is of one mind with respect to these matters. Apparently they had hoped that it would be fairly easy to get a foot in the door in economically weaker Eastern European countries.
Such stumbling blocks are unlikely to prevent the economic convergence of the Eurasian continent, though. China has also long engaged in intense cooperation with Russia, not only in the energy business but also in gold trading – also with the aim of sidestepping the dollar.[17]
This brings us back to the subject of currencies. In recent months European central banks have openly signaled that the renminbi is now regarded as a reserve currency and have cautiously taken the first steps to build up positions in the currency. The German Bundesbank, the Banque de France, and the ECB have shifted small amounts of US dollars into yuan in response to the growing importance of trade between China and Europe.
China for its part has always supported the euro. That was already the case in 2002 when the common European currency was still in its infancy. And it remained the case a decade later, when a crisis threatened to break up the euro:
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao says his country will continue to support both the euro and European government bonds.
“I have made clear that China supports a stable euro,” he said. He also promised not to cut China’s investment in European bonds, despite the recent crisis which has weakened the value of many such bonds.[18]
These announcements of support were of course made at a time when China also actively supported the US dollar through purchases of Treasuries. In fact, China has taken over a role previously played by Europe, that of major US creditor.
Sources: Bloomberg, Incrementum AG
Now that China has made clear that it no longer wants to amass additional Treasuries, the US administration has turned to the private sector to obtain funding. Analyst and newsletter author Luke Gromen (Forest for the Trees), whom we highly respect, has done extensive research on these developments. Gold is another important factor he examines in his analyses.
Gromen is among a small number of analysts who have studied the special treatment of gold reserves by the ECB. We have conducted a wide-ranging interview with him on this and other topics, which concludes this section.
We agree with Luke that gold plays an important role in the reorganization of the monetary system (which is what the process of “de-dollarization” represents), albeit not in the sense of a classical gold standard as existed in the 19th or early 20th century. Europe has adopted a new approach. Not only is the total European gold reserve of more than 10,000 tons the largest in the world, but the ECB marks it to market on its balance sheet four times a year.
China has modeled its own approach after this example as well. It is known that Beijing continues to build up its gold reserves. Why this is being done becomes clear only once we grasp the significance of gold in the euro system. Frank Knopers of marketupdate.nl, whom we also hold in high esteem, has summarized the situation as follows:
The ECB was the first central bank to value its gold reserves at market value, instead of a fixed value or weight denomination. Several countries have adopted this gold policy of marking gold reserves to market value. In 2006, Russia adopted a new strategy of buying gold and putting it on the balance sheet at the market value. This year China apparently adopted a similar policy regarding gold. By valuing gold reserves at market value, these central banks join the gradual shift from the current (dollar-based) international monetary system to a new (gold-based) monetary system.
Europe, Russia and China have aligned their gold policy. Each of these countries recognizes gold as an important element of global reserves, valuing the metal at the free market price.[19]
„The successful remonetisation of gold by a major power such as Russia would draw attention to the fault-lines between fiat currencies issued by governments unable or unwilling to do the same and those that can follow in due course. It would be a schism in the world’s dollar-based monetary order.“
Alasdair MacLeod
As discussed above, the process of “de-dollarization” is not a one-dimensional affair that concerns only China, even if the steps taken by Beijing attract most of the attention in view of the current trade dispute. Rather, it is a long-term process that has been underway for at least 40 years, that is, at least since the unilateral – and supposedly “temporary” – suspension of the Bretton-Woods regime by the US in August of 1971.
To shed light on the steps being taken by China nowadays, we must consider them against the backdrop of the introduction of the euro and its significance for international currency markets. “De-dollarization” is not about waging a currency war; it is about the cautious reorganization of an outdated monetary architecture toward a new system that is balanced from the perspective of all major powers – and that can serve as the foundation of a multipolar global economic order.
This effort includes the United States, whose representatives are very likely aware of the long-term advantages of the model envisaged by Europe and China, despite its short-term drawbacks. After all, when the gold exchange standard was abolished in 1971, the US left a back door open for itself: 8,000 tons of shiny gold, which can be used as seed capital for a new system.
Sources: World Gold Council, Incrementum AG
A number of important foundations for this future were laid in China, Europe, and the US in the past year. We have documented the most important ones in this section to give readers an overview of these highly complex processes, which affect all our lives on a number of levels – whether we like it or not. Our interview with Luke Gromen, featured below, serves as a complement to this overview.
[1] „China oil futures launch may threaten primacy of U.S. dollar: UBS“, Reuters, April 26, 2018
[2] See: „China Weighs Slowing or Halting Purchases of U.S. Treasuries”, Bloomberg, January 10, 2018
[3] See: „China taking first steps to pay for oil in yuan this year –sources“, Reuters, March 29, 2018
[4] See: „China will ‘compel’ Saudi Arabia to trade oil in Yuan — and that’s going to affect the US dollar”, CNBC, October 11, 2017
[5] See: „Iran: ‘Der Euro ist unsere wichtigste Handelswährung’“, Die Presse, September 29, 2016 (“The euro is our most important trade currency.”)
[6] See: „Internationalization of the renminbi“, Wikipedia
[7] See: „Exchange Rates and Reserve Currencies China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony“, Der Spiegel, January 26, 2011
[8] „China’s Global Currency: Lever for Financial Reform“, Arthur Kroeber, Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy, Monograph Series Number 3, Februar 2013
[9] See: „RMB Tracker“, Swift
[10] See: „Turnover of OTC foreign exchange instruments, by currency“, Bank of International Settlements
[11] „Die Amerikaner mögen den Euro nicht“, Die Presse, May 21, 2017 (“The Americans don’t like the euro”)
[12] „Euro Breakup Fears Slide to Record Low“, Bloomberg, January 31, 2018
[13] “Das Geld fließt dorthin, wo die Jungen leben”, Die Presse, March 14, 2018 (“Money flows to where young people live”)
[14] See: „As Trade War Heats Up, Biggest Currency Whales Make Their Move“, Bloomberg, March 26, 2018
[15] See: „As Trade War Heats Up, Biggest Currency Whales Make Their Move“, Bloomberg, March 26, 2018
[16] „International Trumpquake: Tentative Stirrings of a Beijing-Berlin Axis“, Der Spiegel, April 20, 2017
[17] „Moscow and Beijing join forces to bypass US Dollar in global markets, shift to Gold trade“, Zero Hedge, April 2, 2017
[18] „China backs the euro at dollar’s expense“, The Telegraph, June 7, 2002
[19] “Analysis: China marks gold reserve at market value”, Marketupdate.nl, October 24, 2015
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