In Gold We Trust 2012: After the Peak

As part of our 20 Years, 20 Threads anniversary series, we revisit the sixth edition of the In Gold We Trust report: the 2012 vintage.

Published in July 2012, it was the first edition released after the climax of the 2000s secular bull market in gold and silver. In hindsight, it marked the beginning of a long and humbling consolidation phase. In fact, one that would test convictions, timing, and assumptions alike.

If you would like to revisit the full original report, you can find it in our archive.

⛰️ The Climax Had Just Passed

By the time the IGWT 2012 was published, the Golden Decade had reached its crescendo:

  • Silver had peaked in late April 2011.

  • Gold reached USD 1,921 on September 6, 2011.

At the time, the correction appeared cyclical. What followed, however, was not a brief pause but a prolonged consolidation that lasted for years. Hence, the 2012 edition sits at a fascinating inflection point: structurally bullish in argument, but published just after a secular peak.


📜 “The Foundation for New All-Time Highs Is in Place”

The tone of the 2012 report was confident. Among the key statements:

  • “The foundation for new all-time-highs is in place.”

  • “USD 2,000 is our next 12M price target.”

  • “Our long-term target of USD 2,300/oz could be on the conservative side.”

The USD 2,300 target, which was derived from the CPI-adjusted 1980 high, was eventually reached. However, it took until April 3, 2024 for gold to sustainably achieve this level.

Despite the price target being proved directionally correct, the timing clearly did not. A reminder that forecasting levels is one challenge, while forecasting time is another.


🔍 Why We Believed the Peak Was Still Ahead

In 2012, we argued that the bull market had not yet reached its ultimate climax. Our reasoning rested on several pillars:

  1. Gold demand was still tiny relative to global debt and financial assets.

  2. The 2000s rally paled in comparison to the 1970s bull market.

  3. There was no parabolic blow-off phase.

  4. Media and public euphoria were largely absent.

From a structural perspective, these arguments were coherent. Nevertheless, instead of being purely structural phenomena, markets are cyclical and psychological as well. The “naysayers” who expected a deeper correction turned out to be right for that cycle.

In short, this was a humbling lesson.


🌬️ Negative Real Rates and Financial Repression

One of the core theses of the IGWT 2012 was that:

“Negative real interest rates constitute a perfect environment for the gold price.”

With zero interest rate policies (ZIRP) extended and sovereign debt at peacetime highs, we expected financial repression to persist. Governments, unable to tolerate high interest rates, would suppress yields and allow inflation to erode real debt burdens.

Therefore, gold was framed not as speculation, but as strategic protection against monetary distortion.

Looking at 2026, this framework remains strikingly relevant.


🌏 Central Banks and the Shift to the East

Another major theme was the structural turn in central bank behavior.

Since 2009, central banks had become net buyers of gold. By 2012, this shift was clearly underway. At the same time, demand from China, India, and emerging markets was increasing significantly.

Physical gold was migrating East.

The remonetisation of gold, as a neutral reserve asset, had begun. In retrospect, this structural shift proved durable and became one of the defining trends of the following decade.


❌🫧 Why Gold Was “Still No Bubble”

Despite the 2011 highs, this report insisted that gold was not in a speculative bubble. As a matter of fact, it was underowned, underweighted, and often viewed with skepticism by mainstream finance.

Ironically, this lack of euphoria did not prevent a prolonged bear phase. Demonstrably, markets can correct even without textbook bubble characteristics. Sentiment alone does not determine cyclical turning points.


⚠️ Volatility as a Late-Stage Feature

One particularly interesting statement from the IGWT 2012 reads:

“A substantially increased level of volatility is a distinctive feature of a trend having made it to its later stages.”

Fast forward to the 2020s Golden Decade. Since October 2025, volatility has surged dramatically, especially during the silver squeeze and the sharp January 2026 correction, when gold fell more than 10% in a single day and silver experienced intraday declines of over 30%.

History may not repeat, but volatility often rhymes.


⛏️ Peak Gold? A Myth Revisited

The 2012 edition also explored Jürgen Müller’s “peak gold” thesis. His dissertation projected a maximum annual gold production of around 3,000 tonnes between 2027 and 2044.

Reality unfolded differently.

  • Gold production surpassed 3,000 tonnes already in 2013.

  • By 2025, global output reached 3,671 tonnes.

Much like Hubbard’s “peak oil,” the peak gold concept underestimated technological progress, economic incentives, and the adaptability of the mining industry. What appeared to be a geological ceiling turned out to be an economic variable.

Another humbling moment.


🏗️ Mining Stocks: Expectations vs. Reality

In the IGWT 2012, by echoing earlier editions, we expected operational and financial leverage among mining companies to shine.

Instead, the following occurred:

  • Revenues peaked in 2012.

  • Net income fell sharply and turned negative in 2013.

  • Losses persisted through 2016.

  • Only in 2019, as gold began rising again, did the trend sustainably reverse.

The reason? Capital expenditures had surged. Mining companies had projected that gold and silver prices would remain elevated or continue rising. That expectation proved wrong.

Higher capex combined with falling metal prices squeezed margins severely.

As we demonstrated in IGWT 2025, this period stands as a clear example of cyclical overconfidence within the sector — and a reminder that even structurally sound theses can falter in the face of timing errors.

Again, a lesson in humility.


🎓 The Enduring Lesson of 2012

The 2012 vintage captured:

  • Post-peak psychology

  • The mechanics of financial repression

  • The early structural shift toward Eastern demand

  • And several painful lessons in timing, supply assumptions, and mining economics

Naturally, it reminds us that markets are complex adaptive systems. Being early can feel indistinguishable from being wrong. Structural truths can coexist with cyclical setbacks.

In hindsight, the IGWT 2012 stands as both a confident macro thesis and a powerful reminder of the limits of forecasting.

We invite you to revisit the full 2012 edition and reflect on its insights in the context of today’s Golden Decade.


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